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I.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
§78-2-2(3) and (5) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE FOR REVIEW
1. The issue presented for review is whether the court of appeals erred in
affirming an award of treble damages for loss, damage and depreciation to personal
property under Utah's forcible detainer statute, Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(3). The court
of appeals' decision on the law is reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v.
Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved below. [See, e.g., R. 103-112; 169-176; 217-226; 230231; 346-356; 529 at 558-579; 304-307 and the court of appeals' decision, Aris Vision
Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Management, Inc., 2005 UT App. 326, Tffl31-33.]

III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
Aris leased premises from JDJ in Salt Lake County for the operation of a laser eye
surgery clinic (the "Premises"). Wasatch managed the Premises for JDJ. Aris ceased all
2

business operations and vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002 without paying rent.
Without JDJ's knowledge or consent, Aris turned over possession of the Premises to the
independent contractor doctors who performed surgeries at the Premises to conduct their
own business on the Premises while Aris and the doctors attempted to negotiate an
agreement for the doctors to purchase Aris's equipment and other personal property
(collectively, the "Personal Property") on the Premises and assume Aris's Lease with JDJ.
When Aris and the doctors had been unable to come to an agreement, Aris sent a
representative to the Premises on January 22, 2002 to remove the Personal Property that
the doctors were then utilizing in their business. When Aris was not permitted to remove
the Personal Property, Aris filed (but did not serve) a Complaint in this action alleging
forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and conversion of its Personal Property, as well as a
claim for declaratory relief. Aris sought damages for not being permitted to remove its
Personal Property. Aris also sought replevin of its Personal Property. [R. 1-26]
On or about February 15, 2002, Aris filed and served an Amended Complaint [R.
27-48] and a motion for a writ of replevin and supporting memorandum and affidavits.
[R. 49-86] The hearing on the replevin motion was later postponed and then cancelled
and the parties worked together for several months to attempt to re-let the Premises and
sell the Personal Property. When these efforts were unsuccessful, Wasatch and JDJ
permitted Aris to remove the Personal Property from the Premises on July 2, 2002. On
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October 28, 2002, JDJ filed a Counterclaim seeking lost rental damages for Aris's breach
of the Lease. [R. 103-112]
A bench trial was held before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on October 14
through 16, 2003. [R. 526-528] Thereafter, closing arguments were heard by Judge Lewis
on November 14, 2003. [R. 529]
On January 27, 2004, Judge Lewis entered a Memorandum Decision finding in
favor of Aris on the Complaint and dismissing JDJ's Counterclaim. Judge Lewis allowed
Aris recovery on its forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and conversion claims in the
amount of $187,687.60 for depreciation and damage to the Personal Property, and for the
value of missing equipment. Judge Lewis then trebled those damages, relying on Utah
Code Ann., §78-36-10(3). Judge Lewis also awarded Aris its attorney's fees under the
Lease. Judge Lewis refused to award punitive damages, ruling that the actions of
Wasatch and JDJ did not amount to a knowing and reckless indifference or disregard of
Aris's rights. [R. 369-375]
Judge Lewis entered judgment in favor of Aris on March 12, 2004. [R. 474]
Wasatch and JDJ filed a Notice of Appeal from that judgment on March 22, 2004. [R.
477]
On July 21, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion affirming the
Judgment. The Honorable Gregory K. Orme dissented on the issues of the award of
treble damages and the award of depreciation damages. [See App. A]
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On November 3, 2005, this Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari with
respect to the issue of whether treble damages were properly awarded for damages to
personal property. [App. B]
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In accordance with Wasatch's and JDJ's obligation to marshal the evidence, the
following facts are set forth in a light most favorable to Aris and are based almost wholly
upon the testimony of Aris's own witnesses:
1. Aris is a California company that owned and operated a laser eye surgery center
(the "Center") located in Suites 100 and 120 of the Woodlands Business Park Tower I in
Murray, Utah (the "Premises"), that Aris leased from JDJ. [R. 409-410, Findings Nos. 1
& 6] The term of the Lease ran through July 31, 2006. [R. 528 at 381-382; Pi's Exs. 9 &
11]
2. Wasatch was a sister company of JDJ, and managed the Woodlands Towers
building as JDJ's agent. [R. 410, Finding No. 8]
3. Aris employed David Skalka ("Skalka") as the manager of the Center and
contracted with four physicians (the "Doctors") on an independent contractor basis to
perform eye surgeries at the Center. [R. 409, Finding No. 2]
4. Aris owned all the equipment and furniture (collectively the "Personal
Property") located at the Center. [R. 527 at 234]

5

Aris Vacated the Premises
5. According to the evidence presented by Aris, the laser eye surgery market
collapsed and on January 3, 2002 Aris decided to close all of its centers the next day,
January 4, 2002, and file bankruptcy. All Aris employees, including Skalka, were
terminated on January 4, 2002 and Aris ceased doing business in Utah on that date. [R.
526 at 38-39; R. 527 at 234-235 & 263-264]
6. Aris presented the testimony of its employees that over the weekend after
January 4, 2002, Aris decided not to file bankruptcy. By January 7, 2002, Aris had
decided to allow the independent contractor Doctors to operate their own business on the
Premises while Aris attempted to come to terms with the Doctors on the purchase of the
Personal Property and assumption of the Lease, On or about January 7, Aris initiated
negotiation with the Doctors and agreed that they could use the Personal Property and
Premises while they negotiated. [R. 527 at 235-237]
7. Aris did not notify Wasatch or JDJ in advance that it was terminating its
business or that it was turning over the Premises to the Doctors. [R. 212, ^[18]
8. Aris did not pay its January rent in the amount of $9,556.38 by January 1, 2002
when it was due pursuant to the Lease. [R. 526 at 9-10] When Aris failed to pay rent,
Wasatch sent out two notices that the rent was past due. Aris did not respond to the
notices. [R. 528 at 384; Pi's Ex. 1, ^16]
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The Personal Property
9. Sometime after Aris terminated its operations, Wasatch's property manager,
Dennis Peacock ("Peacock"), asked Skalka what was going on, Aris had not made the
January rent payment. Skalka told him that he had been terminated by Aris and of Aris's
financial trouble and provided copies of the notices he had received from Aris, which
indicated that Aris had terminated Skalka's employment, was ceasing all operations and
would likely file for bankruptcy protection. Peacock responded to Skalka that Aris's
Personal Property could not be removed from the Premises until Wasatch "found out what
was going on with Aris." [R. 527 at 299-301; R. 411, Finding Nos. 15-18]
10. Paragraph 20.1 of the Lease provided in part:
All moveable personal property of Tenant not removed from the premises
upon the abandonment thereof (as defined at Title 78, Chapter 36 of the
Utah Code Ann. or similar replacement provisions) or upon the termination
of this Lease for any cause whatsoever shall conclusively be deemed to
have been abandoned and may be appropriated, sold, stored, destroyed or
otherwise disposed of by Landlord without notice to Tenant or any other
person and without any obligation to account therefore.
11. When the negotiations between Aris and Skalka and the Doctors proved
unsuccessful, Aris directed that Richard Enright ("Enright"), its Director of Operations,
come to Utah to determine if Skalka and the Doctors had any interest in purchasing the
Personal Property and, if not, to remove the Personal Property. [R. 526 at 36 & 39]
Enright came to Utah without prior notice on January 22, 2002. [Id. at 39 & 89]
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12. When Enright arrived at the Premises, he walked through the space with
Skalka. [Id. at 41-42] There were certain rooms Skalka would not let him enter. [Id. at 83]
The Doctors were preparing for surgeries that day. It was business as usual. Enright did
not have a key to the Premises. Enright asked to do an inventory. Skalka said it would be
pointless to do an inventory because Wasatch had seized the assets. Skalka did not give
Enright permission to take the Personal Property, but told him he would have to speak
with Peacock, Wasatch's property manager at the building. [Id. at 41-42]
13. Skalka took Enright downstairs to meet Peacock, introduced him to Peacock
as Richard Enright from Aris Vision and told Peacock that Enright was there to remove
the Personal Property. Peacock said that the Personal Property could not be removed
because Aris had abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to
pay the January rent and that as a result, Wasatch had seized the Personal Property. [R.
526 at 41-43; R. 413, Finding No. 26]
14. Enright tendered a check for the rent, but Peacock refused to accept it.
Peacock stated that it was too late, that Aris had abandoned the premises and that
Wasatch was not taking Aris's money. Enright denied there had been an abandonment.
[Id. at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No. 27]
15. Enright called Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), Aris's CFO, and told her what had
occurred. Soto then spoke with Skalka and Peacock. Peacock told Soto that Aris had
abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay its January
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rent. Peacock told Soto that Wasatch was therefore entitled to seize Aris's Personal
Property under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease. [R. 413, Finding Nos. 28 & 29] Soto testified
that she responded that Aris was pursuing its right under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to
remove its Personal Property before surrendering the Premises. [R. 413, Finding No. 30]
Soto offered to pay the January rent immediately by wire transfer, but Peacock indicated
it was too late and the payment would not be accepted. [Id., Finding No. 31 ]
16. Peacock told Enright that he needed to leave the Premises and threatened to
have the police remove Enright if he did not leave. [R. 526 at 44-45] Enright testified that
he and Peacock did not have a confrontation on January 22, but "basically a discussion".
[R. 526 at 76-77] Enright left the Premises without removing any Personal Property. [R.
414, Finding No. 35]
17. Aris did not have any keys to the Premises which were occupied by the
Doctors. During his visit, Enright requested a key from Skalka and then requested a key
from Peacock. They both refused to give Enright a key. [Id. at 47]
18. Aris then retained Erik Olson ("Olson") with the law firm of Durham, Jones &
Pinegar, who filed (but did not serve) a Complaint on behalf of Aris on January 23, 2002,
seeking replevin of the Personal Property and damages for the refusal to give Aris the
Personal Property. [R. 414, Finding No. 37]
19. On January 24, 2002, Olson talked with John A. Dahlstrom, Jr. ("Dahlstrom"),
the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Wasatch. Olson told Dahlstrom
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that Aris wanted to remove the Personal Property and wanted access to the Premises to do
so. Dahlstrom responded, "let's see if we can work out a deal". Olsen testified that
Dahlstrom was extremely professional. Dahlstrom proposed that Aris consider a
"business solution" under which Aris would sell its Personal Property to Skalka and the
Doctors and they would assume the Lease. Aris agreed to pursue such an arrangement.
[R. 526 at 153-155; R. 528 at 441-442; R. 415, Finding No. 40] Aris recognized that it
was on the hook for some sort of ongoing monthly rent obligation. [R. 526 at 154-156]
20. Olson acknowledged that between January 24 and February 15, 2002, the
parties were mutually cooperating in an effort to move Skalka and the Doctors into the
Premises. [R. 527 at 219-220]
21. The Doctors moved out of the Premises on February 9, 2002 and moved into a
smaller space in the Building. Wasatch did not supervise the move or retrieve the keys to
the Premises. [R. 527 at 249-251 & Pi's Ex. 12; R. 416, Finding No. 46] Aris and the
Doctors did not work out an arrangement for the Doctors to purchase the Personal
Property. Soto never asked Skalka to remove the Personal Property after Enright left on
January 22. [R. 527 at 330]
22. When the Doctors vacated the Premises, Peacock changed the locks in part to
safeguard the Personal Property so that Skalka and the Doctors who had previous keys
would no longer be able to have access to the Premises. Aris and Olson did not ask for a
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key and Peacock did not give Aris or Olson a key. [R. 527 at 189; 338 & 345] Wasatch
did not advise Aris that the locks had been changed. [Finding No. 47 at R. 488]
23. When Olson heard nothing further from Dahlstrom by mid-February (this was
during the Olympics), Olson filed and served an Amended Complaint and also a motion
for a writ of replevin for possession of the Personal Property. [R. 526 at 157-159; Pi's
Exs. 1&2]
24. Olson discussed the motion for writ of replevin with Dahlstrom a few times.
Dahlstrom said that Wasatch would fight the motion and that Aris could not win, but even
if it did, Aris would have to post an undertaking in the amount of hundreds of thousands
of dollars. Dahlstrom said that Olson could not expect Wasatch to let all security just
walk out the door leaving Wasatch holding the bag. [R. 526 at 160-161]
25. The writ of replevin hearing was originally scheduled for February 26, 2002.
At Dahlstrom's request, the hearing was rescheduled for March 5, 2002. [R. 526 at 161162]
26. Olson then cancelled the March 5 hearing. Olson testified he did so based
upon Dahlstrom's statements that he would oppose the motion and there would be a large
undertaking, but there was no evidence he told Dahlstrom his reason. Aris left the
Personal Property on the Premises. Olson and Dahlstrom agreed to work together to try
to find a new tenant to reduce the damage claim against Aris. It was Olson's intent to try
to reduce Aris's exposure and at the same time avoid the necessity for Aris to file a large
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undertaking. Olson was aware that Aris had four and a half years remaining on a sevenyear lease at approximately $20 a square foot. [R. 527 at 199; R. 528 at 470-471]
27. The parties also agreed to put the litigation on hold while they worked
together to find a new tenant. [R. 527 at 164-166; R. 528 at 470-471] In the seven
months following February 15, Olson took no further action in court to prosecute the
claims until after JDJ's Counterclaim was filed in October 2002. [R. 527 at 197]
28. After January 22, 2002, there was never any occasion when Aris was denied
access to the Premises or attempted to remove any Personal Property from the Premises
where Aris was restrained from doing so. [R. 526 at 13; R. 527 at 200-201] After March
5, 2002, Peacock opened the Premises on several occasions so that Aris could inventory
the Personal Property and show the Premises to prospective tenants. [R. 526 at 12]
29. After March 5, Olson and Dahlstrom had subsequent conversations where they
would catch up with each other about leads for replacement tenants. [R. 527 at 168]
30. Within a week or two after March 5, Olson told Dahlstrom that Aris wanted
access to the Premises for the purpose of inventorying the Personal Property to make sure
that nothing was damaged or missing. Dahlstrom agreed and had Olson make
arrangements directly with Peacock. [R. 527 at 166-167] Dahlstrom told Peacock to let
Aris in any time they asked and to be courteous and help in any way and cooperate. [R.
528 at 361-362]
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31. One of the visits Olson arranged to the Premises was on April 29, 2002 for the
purpose of showing Ed Barber the space. Mr. Barber was interested in perhaps leasing
the space and perhaps purchasing some of the Personal Property. A week later Aris had
another visit with Barber at the Premises. [R. 527 at 168-169; R. 526 at 54-55 & 57]
Peacock was also present during, and supervised, these visits. [Id. at 58] On the April 25
visit, Enright requested that Aris be allowed to remove one item of equipment, a
microkeratome, and Peacock agreed. [Id. at 62]
32. Olson understood that the Personal Property would have greater value in place
if they could find a new tenant and that is why Aris was working with Barber in April and
May to get him to not only buy the equipment, but to move into the Premises. [R. 527 at
223]
33. Sometime before May 20, 2002, Aris reached an agreement with Barber to
purchase some of the equipment for $35,000. [Id. at 171, 173 & 266]
34. Aris worked with Barber for quite a while on taking over the Premises, but
was unsuccessful. [Id. at 171-172]
35. In late May or early June, 2002, Olson told Dahlstrom that Aris was not
making much progress with getting Barber into the space. Olson turned Barber over to
Dahlstrom and Wasatch in the hope that they could work something out with Barber to
lease the Premises. [Id. at 172-173]
36. On June 4, 2002, Olson wrote a letter to Dahlstrom in which he stated:
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As we have discussed over the phone on several occasions, it remains
Aris's intention at the present time to postpone indefinitely the litigation of
the lawsuit Aris has filed against Wasatch including the motion for writ of
replevin in hopes that either Aris or Wasatch can work together in good
faith to find a new tenant to occupy the premises. In the meantime, Aris
will leave its valuable equipment in the space. Aris's efforts to find a
tenant should not be construed in any way to negate Wasatch's duty, if
any, to mitigate the damages. [Id. at 173 & Pi's Ex. 24]1 [Emphasis added]
37. Olson and Enright went to the Premises with Barber on June 10, 2002 to close
the equipment sale. Olson talked with Dahlstrom who said he did not have authorization
for Aris to remove the equipment yet, but anticipated he could get it, but not in time to
close the deal on that day. Olson then told Aris and Barber they were not able to proceed
with the sale that day. [R. 527 at 175-177]
38. The next day Olson talked with Dahlstrom who said Wasatch would only
agree to the transaction if the $35,000 was paid to Wasatch. Olson said there was no way
Aris would agree to that. Dahlstrom then said he would see if his client would be willing
to take $10,000. [Id. at 177-178]
39. Approximately ten days later when Olson had not heard from Dahlstrom, he
told Dahlstrom that Aris was going to go forward with the lawsuit and proceed with the
motion for writ of replevin to get possession of the Personal Property. Dahlstrom
responded on approximately June 25 that Aris could go ahead and remove the Personal

1

Olson testified that he included in his letter the language about the equipment
staying on the Premises based upon the fact that the writ hearing had been cancelled so
Aris was unable to remove the equipment and that he did not intend to waive any claims.
[Id. at 173-174]
14

Property. [Id. at 178-179] Judge Lewis found that Dahlstrom's instructions were a
change from Wasatch's previous instructions not to allow Aris to remove the Personal
Property and that Wasatch refused to allow Aris to take the Personal Property as a
"bargaining chip" in Wasatch's negotiations with Aris over the payment of rent. [R. 421,
Finding No. 76; R. 424, Finding No. 89]
40. The equipment sale to Barber was consummated on July 2, 2002. He did not
ask for a discount because of the delay. [Id. at 264 & 266-267]
41. On July 2, 2002, Aris removed all of the Personal Property from the Premises.
[R. 527 at 240] Two of the lasers were inoperable. [Id. at 251-252]2
Aris's Claimed Damages
42. Soto testified that two of the lasers were damaged so when Aris settled with
VISX the amount of the credit which VISX gave for those lasers was reduced by $53,000
and Judge Lewis awarded this amount. [Id. at 252-253]3
43. There were missing items of equipment. [Id. at 243] Enright did not know who
took the missing Personal Property or if Skalka or the Doctors took any of the equipment

2

JDJ subsequently relet the Premises at a substantially reduced rent because of
market conditions. The undisputed evidence was that JDJ lost $174,561.17. [R. 528 at
395, 397-398, 515-516 and Ex. 65]
3

Soto speculated that the damage to the lasers had to occur sometime after
February 9, 2002 when the Doctors vacated the Premises because the Doctors were
performing surgeries using those lasers. [Id. at 251-252] Soto did not know whether any
of the Aris employees who were fired or any of the Doctors damaged the lasers as they
moved out. [Id. at 288] Skalka did not know one way or another whether any of the
lasers were broken when the Doctors moved out of the Center. [Id. at 329]
15

when they moved out. [R. 526 at 108] Judge Lewis awarded Aris $16,118.82 for the
missing equipment. [R. 494, Finding No. 80]
44. Richard Holdren ("Holdren") testified on behalf of Aris as its damage expert.
Mr. Holdren appraises and sells medical practices and equipment. [R. 526 at 112]
Holdren was asked to value the Personal Property as of January 22, 2002 and as of a date
approximately five months later to determine the difference in value. Holdren testified
that the Personal Property depreciated in value by $118,568.81 during the five months it
remained on the Premises and Judge Lewis awarded damages in that amount.
[Id. at 121-122]

IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Aris vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002 without notice and without paying
rent. At that time, Aris terminated all of its Utah employees and all of its business
operations in Utah, as well as throughout the country. On January 7, in breach of the
Lease, Aris turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor Doctors
to operate their own independent business on the Premises while Aris and the Doctors
attempted to work out an arrangement for Aris to take over the Lease and purchase Aris's
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Personal Property. After January 4, 2002, Aris had no desire or ability to occupy the
Premises.
The court of appeals affirmed Judge Lewis's ruling that Wasatch and JDJ
wrongfully withheld Aris's Personal Property by only allowing access to the Personal
Property to Aris when Aris requested for the purpose of inventorying it and showing it to
third parties. The only damages sought by Aris or awarded to Aris were damages for
depreciation in the value of the Personal Property; damage to the Personal Property and
missing items of Personal Property. No damages were sought or awarded to Aris relating
to its inability to occupy the Premises because Aris had no desire or ability to occupy the
Premises. The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision awarding Aris
treble damages under Utah's real estate forcible detainer statute where the only damages
suffered were with respect to conversion of the Personal Property and Aris did not seek to
reoccupy the Premises and had no desire or ability to do so.

V.
ARGUMENT

The testimony of Aris's own employees at trial established that Aris vacated the
Premises on January 4, 2002 without notice and without paying rent, terminated all
business operations in Utah as well as throughout the country on that date and, in breach
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of the Lease, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor
Doctors to conduct their own independent business on January 7.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals affirmed Judge Lewis's rulings that (1) Aris had
not abandoned the Premises because it had turned the Premises over to the independent
contractor Doctors and did not intend to abandon4; and (2) when two and a half weeks
later, on January 22, 2002, Wasatch and JDJ refused to allow Aris to remove its Personal
Property from the Premises because JDJ had seized that property under paragraph 20.1 of
the Lease, Wasatch and JDJ were guilty of forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and
conversion of the Personal Property.
Moreover, the court of appeals affirmed - - over Judge Orme's dissent - - Judge
Lewis's ruling trebling the Personal Property conversion damages under Utah's real estate
treble damage statute, Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(3). This incredible result was reached
even though Aris was voluntarily cooperating with Wasatch and JDJ for months to relet
the Premises and sell the Personal Property to a new tenant in order to mitigate Aris's
liability for damages. It is respectfully submitted that the court of appeals erred in
awarding treble damages under the real estate forcible detainer statute for conversion of
personal property.

4

The court of appeals ruled that Aris had not abandoned the Premises because it had no
intent to do so even though subjective intent is irrelevant to statutory abandonment under Utah
Code Ann., §78-36-12.3 and the three elements required for statutory abandonment were clearly
met.
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There was no claim or evidence that Aris suffered any damage by virtue of the
alleged detainer of the real estate. Aris had ceased all business operations in Utah and
had vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002. Aris had no employees in Utah; Aris had
no business in Utah; and Aris had no use for the Premises or any ability to occupy the
Premises. In fact, when Aris's Enright came to Utah on January 22, 2002, the
independent contractor Doctors to whom Aris had transferred possession of the Premises
were occupying the Premises and continued to do so until February 9, 2002. Aris made
no demand that the Doctors vacate. Enright only sought access to the Premises to remove
the Personal Property; he did not seek possession of the Premises. Similarly, his boss,
Soto, told Wasatch's Peacock at that time when Peacock told her that JDJ had seized the
Personal Property under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease that Aris was entitled to remove the
Personal Property before surrendering the Premises to JDJ.
In short, at most, all the evidence demonstrated was that Aris wanted to remove its
Personal Property from the Premises. That is not a legal basis for an award of treble
damages under Utah's real property forcible detainer statute.
Wasatch and JDJ have been unable to find any Utah cases dealing with the issue of
whether treble damages can be awarded for conversion of a tenant's personal property.5

5

The only cases that Wasatch and JDJ have been able to locatefromother jurisdictions
on this issue are cases decided many years ago in New York and Michigan in which the courts
held that in forcible entry or detainer cases treble damages could not be recovered for injuries to
personal property. See Arout v. Azar, 219 N.Y.S. 431 (1927); Carman v. Scott, 137 N.W. 655
(Mich. 1912); Shaw v. Hoffman, 1872 WL 3228, *4 (Mich. 1872).
19

However, the treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute is a drastic
remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing tenants of their possession of
real property. Consequently, the statute should be strictly construed. Van Zyverden v.
Farrar, 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1964); Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930)
("The provision for damages in three times the amount of damages is highly penal and
therefore subject to strict construction"). Cf Keller v. Southwood North Medical
Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 108 (Utah 1998) (forcible entry statute only applies to types of
property people can occupy). See also Gibby's Inc. v. Aylett, 615 P.2d 949, 951 (Nev.
1980). A landlord's act in converting a tenant's personal property is distinct from the act
of forcibly detaining real property a tenant is occupying. A tenant should be relegated to
an action for conversion and replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible
detainer statute should not be applied to a landlord's alleged wrongful withholding of
personal property, especially after the tenant has vacated the premises.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Orme stated that he was "baffled" by the
affirmance of the award of treble damages for conversion of personal property based
upon the real estate forcible detainer statute that permits the "extraordinary remedy of
tripling the amount of actual damages". Judge Orme correctly recognized that the "severe
remedy of treble damages is available because of the special status of real estate, and it is
a remedy that is pretty well limited to real property contexts." [2005 UT App. 325 at ^[36]
Judge Orme concluded that "[i]t subverts the purpose of that long-standing policy
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favoring real estate to treble all damages in an action between a tenant and landlord just
because forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of that litigation." [Id.]
Although Aris has never contended that the Personal Property damage constituted
consequential damage resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises, Judge Orme
reasoned that even if the Personal Property damage could be viewed as constituting
consequential damages, the Personal Property damage was not recoverable as
consequential damage because no general damages constituting reasonable rental value of
the Premises were sought or awarded. See, Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 207, 211 and 214
(Utah 1930) overruled in part on other grounds, P. K Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 108 (Utah
1991); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025-1026 (Utah App. 1989). Judge
Orme correctly observed that consequential damages cannot be recovered unless general
damages are awarded. See, Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039, 1041-1043 (Utah
1981); Cohn v. 1 C Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975).
The award of treble damages in this case is especially ironic given the fact that
Aris had turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor doctors
weeks before the conversion of the Personal Property found by the court of appeals
occurred. Aris had no desire or ability to reoccupy the Premises; Aris was working with
Wasatch and JDJ for months to attempt to relet the Premises and sell the Personal
Property to mitigate Aris's liability for future rent; and the trial court refused to award
punitive damages against Wasatch and JDJ with respect to conversion of the Personal
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Property because the trial court determined they did not act with knowing and reckless
indifference or disregard of Aris's rights. [R. 369-375]
In summary, the real estate forcible detainer statute should not be applied to
sanction the drastic penalty of treble damages for conversion of personal property.
Moreover, even if such a treble damage award could be given as consequential damages
where a landlord deprives a tenant of possession of the real estate, the treble damages
awarded in the present case could not be justified. Aris had turned over possession of the
Premises to the independent contractor doctors weeks before the Personal Property was
withheld and Aris did not seek to reoccupy the Premises and had no reason or ability to
do so.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the court
of appeals affirming the award of treble damages should be reversed and the Judgment
modified to eliminate the award of treble damages.
DATED this / 5 ^ day of December, 2005.
BURBIDj

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Petitioners
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Background: Tenant sued landlord alleging
forcible
detainer,
wrongful
eviction,
and
conversion Landlord counterclaimed that tenant
abandoned the premises The Third District Court,
Salt Lake Department, Leslie A Lewis, J, entered
judgment for tenant and awarded treble damages
on the forcible detainer claim Landlord appealed
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge, held that
(1) tenant's actions were insufficient to constitute
statutory abandonment,
(2) tenants actions were insufficient to constitute
common-law abandonment,
(3) landlord used force and threats to unlawfully
hold and keep possession of leased premises,
(4) tenant was not required to seek restitution
under the forcible detainer statute,
(5) landlord wrongfully evicted tenant,
(6) tenant did not waive its conversion claim,
(7) tenant was entitled to trebled damages for
conversion damages resultmg from forcible detainer
Affirmed
Orme, J, dissented and filed opimon
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The district court's application of the law to the
facts of a case is reviewed for abuse of discretion
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30kl008 1(14) Most Cited Cases
[2] Landlord and Tenant € ^ n o ( l )
233kl 10(1) Most Cited Cases
Common-law abandonment of a leased premises
depends on the mtent of the party accused of the
act, and the determination of that mtent is a
question of fact, which will only be reversed if the
district court's finding is clearly erroneous
[3] Appeal and Error €==>842(1)
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases
Matters of statutory construction are questions of
law that are reviewed for correctness
[4] Appeal and Error €=^1008.1(5)
30kl008 1(5) Most Cited Cases
Questions of fact are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard, with deference given to the trial
court
[5] Appeal and Error €^1008.1(8.1)
30kl008 1(8 1) Most Cited Cases
The determination of mtent to waive a claim is a
question of fact, and thus, will only be reversed if
the district court's finding is clearly erroneous
[6] Appeal and Error €=^1013
30kl013 Most Cited Cases
Because the adequacy of damages is a question of
fact, the reviewmg court cannot overturn the trial
court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous
[7] Landlord and Tenant €^>110(1)
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constitute statutory abandonment of leased
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premises, which were used as a laser eye surgery
center, even though tenant did not inform landlord
of any possible absence from the premises and
tenant failed to pay monthly rent when due, where
doctors, who were independent contractors of
tenant, continued to perform laser eye surgery using
tenant's equipment on the premises West's U C A §
78-36-12 3(3)
[8] Landlord and Tenant €^110(1)
233kl 10(1) Most Cited Cases
Commercial tenant's conduct in terminating its
office manager, informing various vendors that it
was closing its business, and failing to pay rent was
insufficient to constitute common law abandonment
of leased premises that were used as a laser eye
surgery center, even though doctors, who were
independent contractors, contmued to perform
surgery on premises, where tenant did not turn over
contractual rights to possession to the doctors, but
merely allowed the doctors to continue to use its
equipment while negotiations for sale of the
business took place
[9] Landlord and Tenant €^110(1)
233kl 10(1) Most Cited Cases
Under
the
common-law
definition
of
"abandonment," a lease may be abandoned when a
tenant voluntarily relinquishes or vacates the leased
premises with the intention to terminate contractual
nghts to possession and control of the premises,
which requisite intent can be shown by words or
conduct
[10] Landlord and Tenant €=>H2.5
233kl 12 5 Most Cited Cases
Whether a common law abandonment or surrender
occurred is for the trial court to determine from the
conduct and expressions of the parties with respect
thereto
[11] Landlord and Tenant €==>278.17(1)
233k278 17(1) Most Cited Cases
[11] Landlord and Tenant €==>288
233k288 Most Cited Cases
In order to comply with forcible detamer statute,
unless a tenant plainly abandons the premises, a
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landlord must
to be rid of
landlord who
evicted tenant

resort to judicial process if he wishes
a tenant in peaceable possession, a
resorts to self-help is liable to the
West's U C A § 78-36-2

[12] Landlord and Tenant €=^278.17(1)
233k278 17(1) Most Cited Cases
Landlord used force or threats to unlawfully hold
and keep possession of the leased premises, as
required for liability to tenant under the forcible
detainer statute, even though landlord claimed the
tenant abandoned the premises, landlord refused to
allow tenant to remove its equipment from the
premises, landlord threatened to call the police if
tenant did not leave the premises, landlord changed
the locks on two occasions and only allowed tenant
access to premises under supervision, and tenant's
actions were insufficient to constitute abandonment
West's U C A § 78-36-2
[13] Landlord and Tenant €==>278.17(3)
233k278 17(3) Most Cited Cases
Restitution of the premises was a permissive
remedy under forcible detainer statutes, and thus
tenant's claim for damages, without an additional
claim for restitution of the premises, did not
invalidate its claim under the statutes West's
U C A §§78-36-2,78-36-10
[14] Appeal and Error €^173(2)
30kl73(2) Most Cited Cases
Landlord waived for appellate review issue of
whether forcible detainer statute did not apply m
tenant's action after landlord held tenant's
equipment due to statutory lessor's hen, where issue
was raised for the first time on appeal West's
U C A §38-3-1
[15] Landlord and Tenant €=>278.17(1)
233k278 17(1) Most Cited Cases
Landlord wrongfully evicted tenant by not
permitting tenant complete access to the premises,
tenant was m legal possession and had not
abandoned the premises, and tenant's representative
was denied access to the premises to remove
tenant's equipment and was threatened with police
action if he did not leave immediately West's
U C A §78-36-10
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[16] Stipulations €^14(11)
363kl4(ll) Most Cited Cases
Tenant's agreement to postpone a hearing in its
replevin action against landlord to recover its
equipment was not a waiver of its conversion claim,
postponement was sought while tenant and landlord
attempted to find new tenants for the premises,
there was no settlement between the parties, and
tenant did not expressly agree to waive its claim

tort not been committed
*26 Richard D Burbidge and Stephen B Mitchell,
Burbidge & Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
R Stephen Marshall and Erik A Olson, Durham
Jones & Pmegar, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME
OPINION

[17] Landlord and Tenant €==>278.17(4)
233k278 17(4) Most Cited Cases
Tenant was entitled to trebling of damages for
landlord's conversion of personal property as a
result of a forcible detainer, given that forcible
detainer statute did not limit damages to rental
value of premises during the period of the detainer,
tenant's damages totaled $187,687 63 for damage
to, and depreciation of equipment and for missing
equipment, which were trebled under the statute
West'sUCA §78-36-10
[18] Landlord and Tenant €==>278.17(4)
233k278 17(4) Most Cited Cases
A landlord who resorts to self-help is liable to the
evicted tenant for all damages proximately caused
by the eviction West's U C A § 78-36- 10
[19] Appeal and Error €^842(1)
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases
Whether the district court applied the correct rule
for measuring damages is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness
[20] Trover and Conversion €=>46
389k46 Most Cited Cases
The measure of damages m a conversion action is
generally the value of the converted property at the
time of conversion, plus interest
[21] Damages €=>95
115k95 Most Cited Cases
[21] Damages €=^103
115kl03 Most Cited Cases
To the extent possible, the fundamental purpose of
compensatory damages is to place the plaintiff in
the same position he would have occupied had the
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BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge
**1 Defendants appeal a judgment m favor of Aris
Vision Institute, Inc (Aris) for forcible detainer,
wrongful eviction, and conversion of personal
property We affirm
BACKGROUND
**2 Aris, a California corporation, owned and
operated a laser eye surgery center (the premises)
located at the Woodlands Business Park in Murray,
Utah Aris owned all the equipment and furniture
(collectively, "equipment") located at the premises
Aris contracted with four doctors to perform eye
surgeries on the premises using Ans's equipment
and hired a manager, David Skalka Aris leased the
premises from Defendant JDJ Properties, Inc (JDJ),
pursuant to a 1995 lease agreement Defendant
Wasatch Property Management, Inc (Wasatch), a
sister company and an agent of JDJ, managed the
premises and collected rents from Aris
**3 After an industry downturn, Aris made the
decision to close the business and contemplated
filing for bankruptcy On January 4, 2002, Aris
terminated Skalka and provided vanous notices to
him and vanous vendors that it "was in the
unfortunate position of havmg to wind down it[s]
current operations and liquidate its business prior to
dissolution" In early January, Axis began
negotiations with the doctors and Skalka to sell the
equipment and transfer the lease During the
negotiations, Skalka and the doctors contmued to
occupy the premises and perform surgeries usmg
Ans's equipment
**4 Aris failed to pay the January rent of
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$9,556 38 Skalka notified Wasatch's building
manager, Dennis Peacock, and property manager,
Anita Lockhart, about Aris's intention to terminate
the business and file for bankruptcy Peacock
instructed Skalka to not let anyone remove the
equipment from the premises
**5 The negotiations between Aris and the doctors
proved unsuccessful On January 22, 2002, Richard
Enright, an Aris manager, came to the premises to
remove Aris's equipment Upon Enright's arrival,
Skalka recited Peacock's instructions that Aris was
not allowed to remove the equipment and told
Enright that he should speak with Peacock directly
Peacock told Enright that, by Aris's failure to pay
the January rent, it had abandoned the premises and
that Defendants had seized Aris's equipment
Enright tendered a check for the January rent, but
Peacock refused to accept the check or to release
the equipment

unsuccessful Unknown to Aris, Wasatch and the
doctors were negotiating a separate lease, where the
doctors would occupy other space in Woodlands
Business Park
**8 In early February, Skalka and the doctors
relocated within Woodlands Business Park, without
supervision from Wasatch Peacock changed the
locks on the premises and did not provide notice or
a key to Aris A few days later, Aris served a writ of
replevin for the equipment Dahlstrom informed
Olson that Wasatch would protest the writ of
replevin and seek a large bond Based on Wasatch's
assertions, Aris agreed to postpone the hearing on
its writ of replevin and to help Wasatch locate a
new tenant

**6 While still in the presence of Skalka and
Peacock, Enright phoned Kathleen Soto, Aris's
CFO Soto spoke with Peacock and requested that
Wasatch release the equipment to Axis, offering
agam to pay the January rent Peacock again
refused to accept the rent or to release the
equipment Enright made one more request for the
equipment Peacock responded by instructing
Enright to leave the premises and threatened "*27
to have the police forcefully remove Enright if he
ever returned again" Sometime during this visit,
Enright requested a key from Skalka and Peacock,
but both refused the request

**9 From March to June 2002, Wasatch provided
Aris limited, supervised access to the premises
Peacock would unlock the premises and then
supervise the visit in order to ensure that Aris did
not remove any equipment In March, during a
supervised visit, Enright mventoned the equipment
and discovered that sometime after his January 22
visit, two lasers had been damaged and other
equipment had been removed The missing
equipment included a Statim autoclave worth
$393 60, a Compaq laptop worth $574 98, a
Hansatome microkeratome worth $14,164 68, and
several sunglasses worth $985 56 During another
supervised \isit, Peacock gave Aris permission to
remove one piece of equipment but insisted that
Aris was not allowed to remove any other
equipment

**7 The next day, Aris's attorney, Erik Olson,
filed this action He also requested from John
Dahlstrom, Defendants' attorney, permission to
enter the premises and remove the equipment, and
also tendered the January rent payment Dahlstrom
refused to release the equipment or to accept the
tender of rent Dahlstrom suggested that a "business
solution" be considered by Aris and the doctors,
basically suggesting that they resume their
negotiations Based on this suggestion, Aris agam
negotiated with the doctors and Skalka m hopes that
they would assume the lease and purchase the
equipment
Again the negotiations proved

**10 In April, Aris and Ed Barber were m
negotiations for Barber to purchase some of the
equipment and assume the lease By May, the
negotiations had ended, with Barber agreeing only
to the sale of the equipment Before finalizing the
sale, Olson asked Dahlstrom for his consent
Dahlstrom replied that he did not anticipate a
problem but that he would need to check with
Wasatch On June 10, 2002, Olson met with Barber
and Peacock at the premises to close the sale
Dahlstrom stopped the transaction because Wasatch
had not yet approved the sale A few days later,
Dahlstrom informed Olson that Wasatch would

© 2005 Thomson/West No C
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approve the sale only if Wasatch received all the
proceeds Ans did not agree to Wasatch's condition
**11 Later in June, Sale Lake County posted a
notice of seizure on the premises for past due
property taxes After the county posted the notice,
Peacock changed the locks a second time and again
did not provide notice or keys to Ans About that
same time, Soto came to Utah with the mtention of
breaking the locks and removing the equipment
She discovered the tax notice and went to the Salt
Lake County Assessor's office and paid the past due
amount She did not remove the equipment that day
because it appeared that Wasatch's employees were
guarding the premises
**12 After Soto's visit, Olson informed Dahlstrom
that Axis mtended to proceed with the lawsuit On
June 25, 2002, Dahlstrom told Olson that Ans
could remove all of its equipment and represented
that Wasatch never intended to withhold the
equipment Lockhart, via email, instructed Peacock
to allow Ans to remove the equipment Peacock
responded with the question, "Is this corcect?"
Lockhart confirmed that Ans was now entitled to
remove all of its equipment On July 2, 2002, Soto
removed Ans's equipment and the sale to Barber
finally took place

awarded damages for the following depreciation in
the amount of $118,568 81, missing equipment in
the amount of $16,11882, and damage to Ans's
lasers in the amount of $53,000 The damages
totaled $187,687 63, which the distnct court trebled
pursuant to the forcible detainer statute The
district court additionally awarded Ans its deposit
of $13,393 89, less the January rent of $9,556 38,
plus costs and attorney fees The district court
dismissed Defendants' counterclaim based on its
holding that Ans did not abandon the premises
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] **15 First, Defendants argue that the
district court erred in ruling that Ans did not
abandon the premises
Utah Code section
78-36-12 3 provides a statutory presumption for
abandonment See Utah Code Ann § 78- 36-12 3
(2002) We review the district court's application of
the statute to the facts of the case for abuse of
discretion See Platts v Parents Helping Parents,
947 P2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) Common-law
abandonment depends on the intent of the party
accused of the act See State v Hawkins, 967 P 2d
966, 970 (Utah Ct App 1998) The determination
of mtent is a question of fact, which will only be
reversed if the district court's finding is clearly
erroneous See Pennington v Allstate Ins Co, 973
P2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998), see also 49 AmJur2d
Landlord and Tenant § 250 (1995) ("[A] question
of abandonment is a factual one ")

**13 Ans proceeded with its lawsuit, and
Defendants counterclaimed for unpaid rent During
the three-day bench trial, Ans introduced a written
report and expert witness *28 testimony that the
equipment had depreciated m the amount of
$118,568 81 while m Wasatch's custody Wasatch
did not offer any depreciation evidence or rebuttal
testimony The distnct court found that Ans did not
vacate or surrender the premises, but rather that
Wasatch had forcefully prevented Ans from
enjoying "free, unfettered access to the Premises "
Additionally, the district court determined that
Wasatch had seized Ans's equipment without the
proper judicial process and used it as a "bargaining
chip" for the unpaid rent

[3][4] **16 Second, Defendants claim that the
district court erced in holdmg Defendants liable for
forcible detamer pursuant to Utah Code section
78-36-2 and for wrongful eviction See Utah Code
Ann § 78-36-2 (2002) This issue is a mixed
question of law and fact "Matters of statutory
construction are questions of law that are reviewed
for conectness" Platts, 947 P 2d at 661
"Questions of fact are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard, with deference given to the tnal
court" Id "The trial court's application of law to
the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion" Id

**14 The distnct court held that Defendants were
liable for forcible detamer, wrongful eviction, and
conversion of the equipment The distnct court

[5] **17 Third, Defendants argue that the distnct
court ereed in holding that they converted Ans's
equipment because Ans waived its conversion
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claim. To find a waiver, the court must ascertain
whether Aris intended to waive the claim. See
Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935,
942 (Utah 1993). The determination of intent is a
question of fact, and thus, will only be reversed if
the district court's finding is clearly erroneous. See
Pennington, 973 P.2d at 937.
[6] **18 Finally, Defendants contend that the
district court erred in its assessment of damages.
"Because the adequacy of damages is a question of
fact, we cannot overturn the trial court's findings
unless they are clearly erroneous." In re Estate oj
Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 1996).
ANALYSIS
I. Abandonment
[7] **19 Defendants argue that Aris abandoned
the premises prior to January 22, 2002. Utah Code
section 78-36-12.3(3) provides:
"Abandonment" is presumed in either of the
following situations: (a) the tenant has not
notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent
within 15 days after the due date, and there is no
reasonable evidence other than the presence of
the tenant's personal property that the tenant is
occupying the premises....
*29 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3(3). The statute
"defines 'abandonment' as vacating the premises
without notice by the tenant to the landlord."
Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, 754 P.2d 940,
941 (Utah 1988). Defendants argue that Aris
vacated the premises and failed to pay rent within
fifteen days and thus, as a matter of law, abandoned
the premises. The factual findings show that Aris
did not directly notify Defendants of any possible
absence and did not pay the January rent. However,
the findings also show that the doctors were still
performing surgeries on the premises using Aris's
equipment, and that Aris and the doctors were in
negotiations for the sale of the business. Therefore,
there is "reasonable evidence other than the
presence of [Aris's] personal property" that Aris
was still using the premises, and thus, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that there
was no statutory presumption of abandonment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3(3).
© 2005 Thomson/West. No (

[8] [9] [10] **20 Similarly, there was no
abandonment under the common-law definition. "A
lease may be abandoned when a tenant 'voluntarily
relinquishes or vacates the leased premises with the
intention to terminate contractual rights to ...
possession and control of the premises. The
requisite intent can be shown by words or conduct.'
" State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (alteration in original) (quoting 49
Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 250 (1995)).
Whether an abandonment or surrender occurred,
"was for the trial court to determine from the
conduct and expressions of the parties with respect
thereto." Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327,
1330 (Utah 1977).
**21 Defendants assert that Aris abandoned the
lease by vacating the premises and turning over
possession to the doctors. Whether Aris abandoned
the premises depends on whether Aris intended to "
'terminate contractual rights to ... possession and
control of the premises,' " which is a question of
fact. Hawkins, 967 P.2d at 970 (alteration in
original) (quoting 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and
Tenant § 250 (1995)); see also Pennington v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998)
("We emphasize that intent is a question of fact.").
The district court's holding that Aris did not intend
to abandon the premises prior to January 22, 2002,
is not clearly erroneous. Aris did not turn over
contractual rights to possession to the doctors, but
merely allowed the doctors to continue to use Aris's
equipment while negotiations took place. See, e.g.,
Ontel Corp. v. Helasol Realty Corp., 130 A.D.2d
639, 515 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1987) (holding that the
tenant did not abandon the lease where it "was
merely readying the premises in preparation for the
occupancy by the proposed assignee"). Where Aris
did not intend to abandon the premises prior to
January 22, 2002, the district court properly held
there was no abandonment. See Hawkins, 967 P.2d
at 970.
II. Forcible Detainer and Wrongful Eviction
[11] **22 "Both [the forcible entry and detainer]
statutes and the tort action derived from them
require that unless a tenant plainly abandons the
premises, a landlord must resort to judicial process
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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if he wishes to be rid of a tenant in peaceable
possession " Pentecost v Harward, 699 P 2d 696,
699- 700 (Utah 1985) "One who resorts to
self-help is liable to the evicted tenant " Id
[12] **23 Defendants argue that even if the court
finds there was no abandonment, the forcible
detainer statute still does not apply The statute
provides
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who
either (1) by force, or by menaces and threats of
violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the
possession of any real property, whether the same
was acquired peaceably or otherwise, or, (2) in
the nighttime, or during the absence of the
occupants of any real property, unlawfully enters
thereon, and after demand made for the surrender
thereof, refuses for the period of three days to
surrender the same to such former occupant The
occupant of real property within the meaning of
this subdivision is one who within five days
precedmg such unlawful entry was m the
peaceable and undisturbed possession of such
lands
Utah Code Ann § 78-36-2 (2002) The district
court held that Defendants unlawfully *30 held the
premises by force creating a forcible detainer under
part (1) of the statute The factual findings reflect
the following Defendants refused to allow Ans to
remove its equipment from the premises, despite
several requests from Ans representatives,
Defendants directed Ans's representative, Ennght,
to leave the premises or they would contact the
police, Defendants changed the locks on two
occasions without notifying Ans or providing it a
key, Defendants provided Ans supervised access to
the premises, requiring Ans to gain permission to
enter,
on
several
occasions
Defendants
intentionally deprived Ans from entry onto the
premises, and, "Ans did not have free and
unfettered access to the premises nor could it
remove its personal property" Based on these
findings of fact, the district court did not abuse its
discretion m holding that Defendants used "force"
and "unlawfully [held] and [kept] possession of
[the] real property" Id § 78- 36-2(1)
**24 Defendants, although conceding the findings
© 2005 Thomson/West No (
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of fact, offer several arguments in their brief as to
why the forcible detainer statute does not apply
First, they argue that their actions against Ans did
not constitute force and, therefore, they are not
liable under Utah Code section 78-36- 2(1) The
district court's findings that Defendants used "force,
or
menaces and threats of violence," are
supported by the evidence Id Defendants changed
the locks and on one occasion threatened to call the
police if an Ans representative did not leave the
premises However, even if Defendants' actions did
not constitute force, they would still be liable for
forcible detamer under part (2) of Utah Code
section 78-36-2, where "during the absence of the
occupants" Defendants unlawfully entered the
premises and refused to sunender the premises to
Ans Id § 78-36-2(2)
**25 Second, Defendants assert that they legally
could not render possession to Ans because the
doctors possessed the premises, and Ans did not
have the nght to take possession by self-help This
argument is not sound Ans did not abandon the
premises, and therefore, Ans still had rights to
possession Though Ans and the doctors discussed
the option of the doctors assummg the lease, the
negotiations were unsuccessful, and the doctors did
not have any rights to the premises supenor to those
of Ans
**26 Third, Defendants claim that, pursuant to
paragraph 20 1 of the lease, they were entitled to
enter the premises and dispose of the equipment if
Ans abandoned the premises However, because
there was no abandonment, this clause m the lease
does not apply
[13][14] **27 Fourth, Defendants assert that the
forcible detainer statute does not apply because Axis
did not seek restitution of the premises Defendants
argue that the statute limits relief to those seeking
restitution [FN1] Although "[e]very person" who
commits the acts specified m the statute "is guilty of
forcible detainer," id § 78-36-2, Defendants cite
Utah Code section 78-36-10(1), which provides that
"[a] judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall
include an order for the restitution of the premises "
Utah Code Ann § 78-36-10(1) (2002) However,
to Ong U S Govt Works
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that same section also provides a plaintiff with the
nght to be awarded damages incurred as the result
of the forcible detainer See Utah Code Ann §
78-36-10(2) A tenant is therefore entitled to
restitution and an award of damages upon showing
the landlord's liability See id A tenant is not
required to seek restitution of the premises-but may
pursue such relief See Fowler v Setter, 838 P 2d
675, 679 (Utah Ct App 1992) (holding that
"pursuant to section 78-36-10(3), the trial court was
required to treble the jury's damages award" where
the court found forcible entry, even though the
plaintiffs did not seek restitution), Pentecost v
Harward, 699 P 2d 696, 699 (Utah 1985) (holding
that if the facts were viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff they would support an
action against the defendants for forcible entry
under the statute and *31 the tort action derived
from such statute, where the party was seeking
damages), Peterson v Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400
P2d 507, 508 (1965) (affirming an award of
damages under the forcible entry and detainer
statute, without any mention of the party seeking
restitution) The district court therefore properly
interpreted the forcible detainer statute by
awarding treble damages to Aris, even though it
did not seek restitution [FN2]
FN1 Defendants rely upon Freeway Park
Building, Inc v Western States Wholesale
Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P 2d 778
(1969) In Freeway Park, unlike in the
present case, the parties did not brmg an
action for forcible detamer Therefore, the
court's dicta as to when the forcible
detamer statute applies does not govern
this case
FN2 Defendants also assert that the
forcible detainer statute does not apply
because Defendants had a lessor's hen on
the equipment pursuant to Utah Code
section 38-3-1 See Utah Code Ann §
38-3-1 (2001) Defendants did not raise
this argument below, and therefore, cannot
address it on appeal See Carrier v Salt
Lake County, 2004 UT 98,11 43, 104 P 3d
1208

[15] **28 Additionally, Defendants separately
assert that the district court erred in ruling that they
were liable for wrongful eviction As stated above,
Aris did not abandon the premises, and therefore, it
was m legal possession Defendants wrongfully
evicted Aris by not permitting Aris complete access
to the premises on January 22, 2002 See Freeway
Park Bldg, Inc v Western States Wholesale Supply,
22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P 2d 778, 781 (1969) (stating
that a landlord cannot take the law into his own
hands and evict a defaulting tenant)
III Conversion
[16] **29 Defendants assert that the district court
erred in ruling that they converted Aris's equipment
because Aris had abandoned the premises and
turned over possession to the doctors As explained
above, Aris did not abandon the premises, and
therefore, Defendants' argument fails Defendants
also claim that Aris waived its claim of conversion
by leaving the equipment on the premises and
working with Defendants to find a new tenant The
Utah Supreme Court has stated "that there is only
one legal standard required to establish waiver
under Utah law
A waiver is the mtentional
relinquishment of a known right To constitute a
waiver, there must be an existing nght, benefit or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an
intention to relinquish it" Soter's v Deseret Fed
Sav & Loan, 857 P 2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)
(citation and quotations omitted) A waiver "must
be distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied" Id at 940 (quotations and citation
omitted)
**30 The district court specifically held that Axis
did not waive its conversion claim Aris agreed to
postpone the hearing on its writ of replevm while
the parties tried to find a new tenant for the
premises There was not a settlement between the
parties, only an agreement to postpone litigation to
see if a settlement could be reached There was no
expressed or implied distinctive waiver, therefore,
the district court's holdmg was not clearly
erroneous See id, see also Pennington v Allstate
Ins Co 973 P 2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) (statmg
that the determination of intent is a question of fact,
and thus, will only be reversed if the district court's
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finding is clearly erroneous).
IV. Damages
[17][18][19][20][21] **31 "One who resorts to
self-help is liable to the evicted tenant for all
damages proximately caused by the eviction ...."
Pentecost, 699 P.2d at 700. Utah Code section
78-36-10 states that M[t]he jury or the [district] court
... shall also assess the damages resulting to the
plaintiff" Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. Defendants
assert that the district court erred in its assessment
of damages. The district court's assessment of
damages is not clearly erroneous, and therefore, we
do not upset its determination. [FN3] See In re
Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah
1996). The amount of damages totaled
$187,687.63, [FN4] and under the forcible *32
detainer statute, the judgment shall be "for three
times the amount of damages assessed." [FN5]
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3). We therefore
affirm the award of $563,062.90.
FN3. Defendants argue that the district
court erred by awarding lost opportunity
damages. Though the district court
considered evidence on the issue, it did not
in fact award such damages.
FN4. The dissent opposes the award of
$118,000 in depreciation, stating that
"depreciation is not a measure of
recoverable damages at all." "Whether the
district court applied the correct rule for
measuring damages is a question of law
that we review for correctness." Mahana
v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59,K
25, 96 P.3d 893 (Utah 2004). "Generally,
the measure of damages in a conversion
action is the value of the converted
property at the time of conversion, plus
interest." Id. at ^ 26. "To the extent
possible, the fundamental purpose of
compensatory damages is to place the
plaintiff in the same position he would
have occupied had the tort not been
committed." Id. In this case, the district
court awarded the value of the property at
the time of conversion less the end value of

the property. Where Wasatch eventually
returned the property to Aris, the district
court, in awarding depreciation or
diminishment in value, placed Aris "in the
same position [it] would have occupied
had the tort not been committed." Id.
FN5. The dissent asserts that damages for
conversion of personal property as a result
of a forcible detainer should not be trebled
as required by the forcible detainer statute.
Utah Code section 78-36-10 requires that
damages "resulting to the plaintiff from ...
forcible or unlawful detainer" be trebled.
Utah Code Ann. 78-36-10 (2002). As the
dissent quotes, "the plaintiff is entitled to
recover such damages as are the natural
and proximate consequence of the
unlawful detainer." Forrester v. Cook, 11
Utah 137, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930). The
dissent contends, citing Forrester, that
"general damages for forcible detainer is
the reasonable rental value of the premises
for the time during which they were
unlawfully
detained."
However,
the
Forrester court merely held that the "rental
value during the unlawful withholding of
possession is the minimum of damages"
and "damages may not be restricted to the
rental value and may include more."
Forrester, 292 P. at 214.
CONCLUSION
**32 Aris did not abandon the premises where it
did not intend to vacate prior to January 22, 2002.
Given that there was no abandonment, Defendants
are liable for forcible detainer, wrongful eviction,
and conversion where they took and kept possession
of the premises by self-help. Further, Aris did not
waive a conversion claim by agreeing to postpone
the hearing on its writ of replevin and assist
Defendants in locating a new tenant. Finally, the
district court properly assessed the amount of
damages.
**33 Accordingly, we affirm.
**341 CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
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ORME, Judge (dissenting):
**35 I am baffled by the trial court's award of
damages and by the majority's affirmance of the
entire award. I have no problem with the award of
some $16,000 to compensate the tenant for personal
property that came up missing while the landlord
was wrongfully in possession of the premises.
Likewise, I have no qualms about an award of
$53,000 to compensate the tenant for damage to its
lasers while in the landlord's "care." I fail to see,
however, how damages for conversion and damages
for trespass to chattels can be trebled pursuant to a
statute that permits the extraordinary remedy of
tripling the amount of actual damages for the
forcible detainer of a real estate leasehold.
**36 The severe remedy of treble damages is
available because of the special status of real estate,
and it is a remedy that is pretty well limited to real
property contexts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-2
(2002) (providing for trebling of damages for waste
of real estate); id. § 78-38-3 (providing for trebling
of damages to owner of land whose trees are cut
down
without
authorization);
id.
§
78-36-10(2)(a)-(d), (3) (providing for trebling of
damages for forcible entry, forcible or unlawful
detainer, and waste, but not for unpaid rent). It
subverts the purpose of that long-standing policy
favoring real estate to treble all damages in an
action between a tenant and landlord just because
forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of
that litigation. See Forrester v. Cook, 11 Utah 137,
292 P. 206, 214 (1930) ( "The provision for
damages in three times the amount of [actual]
damages is highly penal and therefore subject to
strict construction. While the statute provides for
recovery of rents, damages, and waste, it is damages
only that are to be trebled.... The plaintiff is entitled
to recover such damages as are the natural and
proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer."),
overruled in part on other grounds by P.K Inv. v.
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018,1020-21 (Utah 1991).
**37 The measure of general damages for forcible
detainer is the reasonable rental value of the
premises for the time during which they were
unlawfully detained. See id. at 211, 214. Accord
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C

Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025-26
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (relying on Forrester, appellate
court affirmed *33 unlawful detainer damages of
$300, representing the "reasonable rental value" of
the premises for the period they were unlawfully
detained, but directed trebling in accordance with
statute because such "rental value" is damages for
unlawful detainer rather than rent, as trial court
assumed). Such general damages appear not to
have been awarded in this case. Insofar as the
damages that were awarded might be viewed as
consequential damages resulting from forcible
detainer, it is settled law that consequential or
"special" damages are available, if at all, only if
general damages are awarded. [FN1] See 22
Am.Jur.2d Damages § 43 (2d ed. 2003) ("As a
general rule, a verdict for special damages without
an allowance for general damages is improper.").
Cf. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039,
1041-43 (Utah 1981) (noting that jury assessment
of special damages without general damages is
irregularity on face of verdict); Cohn v. J.C.
Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975) (stating
that if judge had believed jury's verdict only
assessed special damages and not general damages,
judge would not have accepted verdict) (Utah
1975); Baden v. Sunset Fuel Co., 225 Or. 116, 357
P.2d 410, 411 (1960) (citing "the well-established
rule" that, in order for there to be an award of
special damages, there must also be an award of
more than nominal damages).
FN1. Which is not to say that I necessarily
agree that all consequential damages
stemming from forcible detainer must be
trebled along with general damages.
**38 More bizarre is the award of over $118,000
in depreciation. So far as I am aware, depreciation
is not a measure of recoverable damages at all;
rather, it is an offset against what would otherwise
be the amount of damages. See generally Dan B.
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 5.12 at 392 (1973) (
"Cost of replacement or repair, with suitable
adjustment for the fact that the damaged or
destroyed property was old and had depreciated in
value, is perhaps the factor most commonly
considered in fixing value of property without
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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market"), id § 5 12 at 394 ("A
number of
courts have
allow[ed] replacement cost less
accrued depreciation[ ]") To award a plaintiff
depreciation as damages is bad enough, but to treble
that amount on a theory that depreciation was
occasioned by the forcible detainer of a real estate
leasehold is untenable given the very nature of
depreciation See Black's Law Dictionary 441 (6th
ed 1991) (defining depreciation as the "decline in
value of property caused by wear or obsolescence")
**39 I would remand this matter with instructions
to comprehensively reassess—and substantially
reduce—the amount of damages awarded to the
tenant
121 P3d 24, 530 Utah Adv Rep 11, 2005 UT
App 326
END OF DOCUMENT
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APPENDIX B
ORDER GRANTING CERTIORARI

FILED

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ITOflAPPELLATE COURTS

NOV 03 2005
ooOoo
^ 7 POP**

Wasatch Property Management, Inc.
and JDJ Properties, Inc.,

Uj

Petitioners,
v.

Case No. 20050693-SC

Aris Vision Institute, Inc.,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on August 17, 2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue: ,
Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation
to personal property may be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-36-10(3).
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
FOR THE COURT:

D

a

t

e

7

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on November 4, 2005, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
STEPHEN B MITCHELL
BURBIDGE Sc MITCHELL
215 S STATE ST STE 920
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-1103
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL
ERIK A OLSON
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 E BROADWAY STE 900
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the court listed below:
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 14023 0
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was placed in
interdepartmental mail to be delivered to the trial court listed
below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN / JODI BAILEY
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this November 4, 2005.

By ^<\^U<^UA-S

VM^f

^LQcx^

Deputy dlerk
Case No. 20050693
Court of Appeals Case No. 20040304
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE Case No. 020900624

